

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

LEONARD T. JELEPIS,	)	CASE NO. 1:05 CV 2047
	)	
Plaintiff,	)	JUDGE DAN AARON POLSTER
	)	
v.	)	<u>MEMORANDUM OF OPINION</u>
	)	<u>AND ORDER</u>
FIRST FEDERAL BANK OF OHIO,	)	
	)	
Defendant.	)	

On August 22, 2005, plaintiff pro se Leonard T. Jelepis filed the above-captioned in forma pauperis action against First Federal Bank of Ohio. For the reasons stated below, this action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).

The complaint states in its entirety as follows:

Plaintiff will show that defendant assesses NSF fees in an arbitrary and capricious manner and engages in discriminatory practices and assess[es] bank fees to some depositors and does not assess them to favored or large depositors. Plaintiff will ask for complete accounting and audit to justify plaintiff's charges.

Plaintiff asks for the return of NSF charges plus 14% compound interest.

Although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the district court is required

to dismiss an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.<sup>1</sup> Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996).

A complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements of some viable legal theory to satisfy federal notice pleading requirements. See Schied v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 1988). District courts are not required to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them or to construct full blown claims from sentence fragments. Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). To do so would "require ...[the courts] to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, ... [and] would...transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most

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<sup>1</sup> A claim may be dismissed sua sponte, without prior notice to the plaintiff and without service of process on the defendant, if the court explicitly states that it is invoking section 1915(e) [formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)] and is dismissing the claim for one of the reasons set forth in the statute. McGore v. Wigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608-09 (6th Cir. 1997); Spruytte v. Walters, 753 F.2d 498, 500 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986); Harris v. Johnson, 784 F.2d 222, 224 (6th Cir. 1986); Brooks v. Seiter, 779 F.2d 1177, 1179 (6th Cir. 1985).

successful strategies for a party." Id. at 1278.

Further, legal conclusions alone are not sufficient to present a valid claim, and this court is not required to accept unwarranted factual inferences. Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1987); see also, Place v. Shepherd, 446 F.2d 1239 (6th Cir. 1971) (conclusory section 1983 claim dismissed). Even liberally construed, the complaint does not contain allegations reasonably suggesting plaintiff might have a valid federal claim. See, Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716 (6th Cir. 1996)(court not required to accept summary allegations or unwarranted legal conclusions in determining whether complaint states a claim for relief).

Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted this action is dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Further, the court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/Dan Aaron Polster 10/6/05  
DAN AARON POLSTER  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE